Monday, January 31, 2022

Humans and the Cell: are we Sharing the Room with Microscopic Colleagues?

    As a human, your most basic biological component is the eukaryotic cell. This remarkable microscopic building block contains proteins and mechanisms for degradation of unnecessary components, for synthesis of the necessary ones, and for replication of itself.  Your body has so many different organ systems, made up of varying organs with extremely complex tissues.  This cell is the basis for this variety in your body; the cell is the reason you can breathe in and out, it's the reason you can read these words on your screen right now.  
    The coordination between tissues to achieve some of our most basic functions is insanely complicated, but it can be summarized in one simple sentence: cells sense one another and can receive and give signals to other cells to elicit some effect.  This effect could be transmitting light waves into neuronal signals to confer an image; it can be sound waves hitting your eardrum, causing fluids in your inner ear to vibrate, move hair cells, and trigger more neuronal signals to confer a sound.  Your heart is (hopefully) beating in perfect rhythm right now, all because the cells in your cardiac tissue are responding to the electrical signals they receive in perfect sync.  
    Many of us take for granted that our cells work in such harmony, but when discussing bioethics, I think we should be especially aware of this most basic concept.  When discussing veganism, animal research, even bacterial research, the ethical person must question the pain they may be inflicting.  So if a cell can sense its surroundings, can sense food and move towards it, can sense poisons and move away from it, doesn't this mean that cells can, in some sense, feel things? Should an ethical person take this into account, or is there some line to draw between feeling pain in the sense that humans do and feeling aversive stimuli in the sense that all biological systems do? 
    Where does the ethicist draw the line? Do organisms with nervous systems qualify as the only lifeforms that feel "pain" as humans do? This definition denies some multicellular animals without nervous systems the ability to feel pain.  In fact, this concept has denied a place in animal cruelty legislation for invertebrates (animals without a spinal cord). Is it that the afflicted organism must make some facial expression to express pain that is recognizable by man? This leaves out any organism without a mechanism for making recognizable facial expression (which includes some humans).
    The implication that cells can feel something like pain opens a whole new can of worms in several ethical arguments, but as bioethicists it's our job to examine these possibilities.  As Campbell talks about in the first chapter of Bioethics: The Basics, to make the best judgment in bioethics, it takes a combined knowledge of philosophical truths and scientific facts.  Knowing that cells sense and respond to their environment is an important part of the scientific facts puzzle.
    The cell is a truly remarkable biological unit. It is efficient and self-sustaining to some extent, and it continues to astound me in its abilities to sense and respond to its environment.  Knowing the extent of this sensing ability is imperative to several bioethical arguments (such as animal research and cruelty, veganism, lab grown meat, stem cell research, etc.).  In a broad sense, the only distinction between a human and a cell could be just the size of the room it's in.
    

4 comments:

  1. Claire, your writing is extremely well-written and thought provoking! I've thought about cells in this way before as well. Right now, I'm working on a research project where cells are grown and discarded. Though these are not unicellular organisms but were derived from multicellular ones, I still had a moment of hesitation when working with them. Like you wrote, there's a question of where is the line. Is it unethical to harm any form of life that is composed of cells?

    Would people have been more outraged if a Chimpanzee was used for the heart transplant instead of a pig? Because Chimpanzees have bigger brains? Because they are more like us? I don't care for arguments about how much respect an organism deserves based on their similarity to humans. It seems a bit egocentric. Though perhaps that's human nature. We often put family and close friends above strangers because we associate them with being in our "group". Similarly, humans may inevitably put the human race above other animals. Even talks about climate change and animal conservation are usually circled back to how action would benefit humans in the long run.

    In terms of ethical decisions, perhaps it's this reflection, consideration, and value for all life that is important. We should try not to carelessly discard any life, whether that's cells or an animal, without first ensuring we act only in necessity (e.g. food), for good (e.g. research to save lives), and the utmost respect for life. I suppose what constitutes as "necessary" and "good" is still up for debate though.

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  2. Claire this is a wonderful add-on to the discussion we were having earlier this semester in class. It brings up many questions on what it means to sense your surrondings, what pain/suffering really is and how to observe it. I for one think we should treat other living organisms with respect and care, since we cannot live without them, especially plants. I think the distinction of feeling and observing can also be the work of our minds, since we are able to see an animal, not necessarily its individual cells, we are more inclined to care for the animal as a whole rather then look at what makes it up. Wonderful post!

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  3. Claire I sincerely appreciate the thought you put into this post! It certainly does make you wonder. I've always found it fascinating that scientists more or less agree that experimentation on invertebrates is more ethical than vertebrates. Just recently I have joined a lab here at MTSU. Interestingly enough, we use Drosophila fruit flys. In order to conduct any research however, we must dissect these animals. When practicing I practically butchered 5. Now imagine that instead of fruit flys, it was a monkey. People would be outraged! But are they both not living eukaryotic cells? Fruit flys certainly have a nervous system -- I see it all the time when dissecting. Where do we draw the line? I mean I guess some sacrifices must be made in order to achieve any worthwhile scientific discoveries. It is certainly strange.

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  4. Fascinating. Generally, ethicists are concerned about pleasure and pain as experienced by persons and sentient organisms. We don't end to think cells have experiences as such, though your question challenges the self-sustaining and self-serving definition of experience in such anthropocentric terms. We should talk about it.

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